Dignaga, On Perception, being the Pratyaksapariccheda of by Dignaga, Masaaki Hattori

By Dignaga, Masaaki Hattori

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Extra resources for Dignaga, On Perception, being the Pratyaksapariccheda of Dignagas Pramanasamuccaya from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions

Sample text

71 Hence it is proved that cognition has two forms. Hc-1. [That cognition has two forms follows] k. lie. later also from [the fact of] recollection—72 This [expression] "later also from [the fact of] recollection" (in k. lie) refers back to "cognition has two forms" "(in k. llab). Some time after [we have per­ ceived a certain object], there occurs [to our mind] the recollection of our cog­ nition as well as the recollection of the object. 74 Why? k. lid. 75 It is unheard of to have a recollection of something without having experienced [it before].

It is admitted that where there is a possibility of deviation [from a rule], a qualifier should be used [in a statement ofthat rule]. 5 Thus, one should not make use of the qualifier ["inexpressible"]. Bb. 1 Bc-1. "Determination" (vyavasdya) means "ascertainment" (niscaya). 9 Bc-2. [If the Naiyäyikas claim that the term vyavasdya in the sütra is not used in the sense of "ascertainment," 10 for example,] if [they claim that] the wording is in order to rule out cognition that does not correspond to a real thing (ayathdrthajndnd) and the like,11 [we answer that] even so the qualifier ["vyavasäyätmaka"] is not appropriate.

For the Vaisesikas, there is a definition, mentioned in the Sütra, 1 of perception in respect to substance (dravyd),2 [which is made meaningful] by a certain relation [to the preceding sütras]. 7 Ba. 10 By the contact of the four [factors], the simple presentation of the object [itself free of any qualifier (visesana)] arises. How could there be [room for] conceptual construction [in this immediate experience (anubhava) of the object] ? ] Bb. In the case of those who claim that the contact of sense and object is the means of cognition, [if they disregard the conceptual construction involved in ascertainment and claim that ascertainment also arises from the contact of 42 Section 4.

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