Airpower & the Cult of the Offensive by John R. Carter

By John R. Carter

Significant Carter explores 3 case reports that experience very important similarities: the doctrine of serious Britain's Royal Air strength from 1918 to 1938, the Israeli Air Force's procedure from 1967 to 1973, and the U.S. Air Force's technique from 1953 to 1965. He starts off by means of setting up the theoretical heritage beneficial for case research research. He dissects the connection among offense and safeguard to find that airpower safety enjoys neither a bonus of place nor of time. He examines the character of offense and protection as they follow to airpower and gives purposes army association might want offensive doctrines. significant Carter identifies the weather and implications of the cult of the offensive.

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Airpower & the Cult of the Offensive

Significant Carter explores 3 case reviews that experience very important similarities: the doctrine of serious Britain's Royal Air strength from 1918 to 1938, the Israeli Air Force's process from 1967 to 1973, and the us Air Force's technique from 1953 to 1965. He starts off by means of developing the theoretical historical past helpful for case learn research.

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The RAF did not sufficiently test its bombing accuracy under simulated combat conditions. 130 To illustrate, RAF planners divided targets into two categories, precise and group. The former category required high accuracy, and since the RAF had previously rejected dive-bombing, these targets demanded a level pass at low altitude. The group targets, which evolved into area targets during the war, did not require the same accuracy since there were many desired impact points within close proximity of each other.

Convinced of the futility of defense, RAF planners procured lightly armed, lightly armored aircraft. Belief in the exaggerated destructive power of aerial attack left the RAF in possession of a bomber fleet that could not find its intended targets, hit them, or destroy them if it could accomplish the first two tasks. Because the RAF’s interwar offensive doctrine failed to consider objectively bomber aircraft capabilities and limitations, the RAF could not perform its planned offensive mission. A misplaced faith in offensive ideology trapped RAF leaders during the interwar period and contributed to their 1938 dilemma.

63 In the book, Liddell Hart identified an enemy population’s will to continue as the key to victory in war. Furthermore, he claimed that an air campaign offered a method to attack enemy will directly, quickly, and with fewer casualties than a land or sea campaign. 64 Around the same time, the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) established the Air Raid Precautions Committee to study the problem of air defense. In its first report in July 1925, the committee concluded that there existed only a slim chance of defending against air attack and that air attacks would 33 CADRE PAPER Giulio Douhet He is the earliest of the classical airpower theorists, and his influence is reputed as definitive for both the Royal Air Force and the United States Air Force.

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